Thursday, August 20, 2015

Romney and the B & O

The "B & O WINTER" command simulation was provisionally titled "Romney Winter." The simulation covers the period and area covered by what is alternatively called The Romney Expedition, The Romney Campaign, or Bathe-Romney Campaign of January 1862. The campaign was part of an effort by Stonewall Jackson to continue disruption of the B & O Railroad and prevent the resumption of rail services on the main line that had been destroyed the previous summer.

Romney itself was not well situated as a defensive position. Its strategic importance was in the road network and its access to various points on the B & O.  In a letter to the Adjutant General of the Confederacy in September 1861, Colonel Angus MacDonald (commander of what would become the 7th Virginia Cavalry), gave this description of Romney in relation to the rail line:


Colonel Angus MacDonald understood the importance of Romney.
"From Romney to the mouth of Little Cacapon is 25 miles; to the mouth of the South Branch, 18 miles; to the town of Cumberland, 27 miles; to New Creek Station, 18 miles; to Piedmont and Bloomington, each 25 miles. All of these are points on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and any one of them may be attacked by a days march from Romney. The distance from the month of the Little Cacapon to Bloomington is about 60 miles. The mean distance from Romney to the railroad is about 20 miles.

It is, I presume, impossible that either army can winter on the top or at the foot of Cheat Mountain. Jacksons force added to mine could hold the rich valleys of the South Branch and Patterson's Creek, and draw from them abundant supplies during the winter, and always have the power to prevent the use -safe use at least - by the enemy of either the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad or Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. If my command is to winter here, it is time to provide quarters for them. In less than fifteen days inclement weather will compel us to strike our tents, if the cowardice of the enemy, now outnumbering us five times, will permit us so long to hold this post. Two-fifths of my regiment are now, by the requirements of the Department, in Berkeley and Jefferson. If I had a regiment of volunteers and three additional pieces of artillery my camp would be defended by them, whilst my mounted men could at any time strike some point on the railroad or canal, and prevent their available use by the enemy." (OR, Chap XIV, pp. 200-201)

MacDonald makes some critical points:
- Romney has strategic importance in striking at the B & O
- There are supplies in the area could be utilized in winter by those who control the area
- Inclement weather could be a problem
- Preventing, or disturbing, the enemy's use of the B & O and C & O is of great importance.

Although Jackson would eventually get much of the credit for the winter initiative against the B & O and control of Romney, MacDonald clearly outlined the key elements of the campaign that would take place three months later.





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